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Deciding Who Cashes in on the 
Deceased Celebrity Business 
Kathy Heller
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the annual list published by Forbes.com, the thirteen 
―Top Earning Dead Celebrities‖ grossed a combined total of $232 million 
in twelve months ending October, 2007.1  The Forbes list is topped by the 
estate of Elvis Presley, which generated $49 million, and includes familiar 
names like Albert Einstein and John Lennon, as well as relative newco-
mers, such as the rapper, Tupac Shakur, and the ―Godfather of Soul,‖ 
James Brown.2  According to industry estimates, ―after Mr. Presley, Ms. 
Monroe and James Dean are the most valuable dead-celebrity brands.‖3 
The licensing of postmortem publicity rights—the commercial use of 
a deceased celebrity‘s name and image—is one of the most valuable 
sources of income for a celebrity‘s estate.4  Although the lucrative licenses 
are carefully marketed, and unlicensed users are often rigorously pursued, 
postmortem publicity rights are currently not recognized by federal law.5  
Furthermore, the right does not exist in common law, and only a few states 
have enacted postmortem publicity rights legislation.6 
 
 Kathy Heller is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Chapman University School of Law.  She is al-
so in private practice in Beverly Hills, California, specializing in entertainment law.  The author would 
like to thank Serra Aladag for her valuable research assistance and thoughtful comments, as well as 
Jeremy Katz of the Chapman Law Review for his diligent editing of this article. 
 1 Jake Paine, Top-Earning Dead Celebrities (Lea Goldman & David M. Ewalt eds.), FORBES. 
COM, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/29/dead-celebrity-earning-biz-media-deadcelebs 
07_cz_lg_1029celeb_land.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Nathan Koppel, Blonde Ambitions: A Battle Erupts Over the Right to Market Marilyn, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at A1. 
 4 Id. (―In 2004, Robert F.X. Sillerman paid Lisa Marie Presley $100 million for an 85% stake in 
Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc., which licenses Mr. Presley‘s image and music.‖). 
 5 Unauthorized use of a deceased celebrity‘s name, voice or likeness may give rise to a false 
endorsement claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act if it causes consumers to be deceived or con-
fused as to whether the celebrity is associated with the goods or services, much like a trademark.  See, 
e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 
F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (―In cases involving confusion over endorsement by a celebrity plain-
tiff, ‗mark‘ means the celebrity‘s persona.‖).  However, a right of publicity claim does not require evi-
dence of likely consumer confusion.  The United States Supreme Court considered the right of publicity 
in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) and found that the First Amendment 
rights of a television news program were outweighed by an entertainer‘s right to earn a living when the 
program aired the entertainer‘s entire performance without his consent. 
 6 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8 (West 2002); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1105 (Supp. 2001). 
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California created a personal publicity right for living persons in 1971 
and thirteen years later recognized a postmortem publicity right.7  The 
courts have struggled to interpret California‘s postmortem publicity law 
and have been reluctant to expand postmortem rights without clear legisla-
tive intent.  When courts have ruled contrary to the claims of a celebrity‘s 
heirs, residuary heirs, and most recently the heir of a residuary heir,8 the 
California legislature has responded by amending or ―clarifying‖ California 
law, each time expressing its clear intent to identify exactly who controls a 
celebrity‘s postmortem publicity rights.9 
The impact of California‘s law on the rights and remedies available to 
claimants reaches well beyond its borders.  Courts generally look to the last 
domicile of the deceased to determine applicable law,10 and California is 
the current home and last domicile of many celebrities.  The California leg-
islature crafted its law to achieve jurisdiction whenever a deceased celebri-
ty‘s image is used ―on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for pur-
poses of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, 
merchandise, goods, or services.‖11 
I.  EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity has its origins in the common law tort of inva-
sion of the right of privacy, which includes a cause of action for appropria-
tion of the plaintiff‘s name or likeness.12 
The gist of the cause of action in a privacy case is . . . a direct wrong of a person-
al character resulting in injury to the feelings . . . of the individual . . . [that] is 
mental and . . . subjective . . . [and] impairs the mental peace and comfort of the 
person and may cause suffering much more acute than that caused by a bodily in-
jury.13 
 
 7 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344, 3344.1 (West Supp. 2008); see also Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. 
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799–800 (Cal. 2001). 
 8 See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 05-02200 MMM 
(MCx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22213 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008). 
 9 See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 799 (noting that the California legislature responded in 
1984 with section 3344.1 after the court‘s holding in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 
1979)). 
 10 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.5, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002).  Pursuant to 
California Civil Code section 946, the decedent must be a resident of California or a resident of another 
jurisdiction that has similar postmortem rights.  The trustee of the Diana Princess of Wales Memorial 
Fund sued a California-based business that was selling a broad range of memorabilia without permis-
sion.  The court determined that, regardless of the location of the violation, the law of the forum where 
the rights-holder resides controls, unless there is a local law to the contrary.  Since the Trust and de-
ceased person (Princess Diana) were not California residents, and the UK did not have a similar right of 
postmortem publicity, there was no violation of California‘s post-mortem publicity rights.  Id. at 1146–
47. 
 11 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2008). 
 12 See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating that ―California 
has long recognized a common law right of privacy.‖); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. 
REV. 383, 389 (1960) (identifies and defines appropriation under common law torts and the privacy 
rubric). 
 13 Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); see also 
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A. Origins of the Right of Publicity 
The common law right of privacy was first recognized in California in 
1931,14 and the Ninth Circuit identified a common law cause of action for 
the right of publicity—distinct from the right of privacy in 1974.15  The 
right of publicity was first recognized in 1953 by the Second Circuit when 
the New York Giants‘ catcher, Wes Westrum, signed contracts giving two 
rival bubble-gum firms the exclusive right to put his image on their base-
ball cards.16  The two companies turned to federal court, which recognized 
an enforceable right of publicity entitling celebrities to a portion of the 
profits derived from merchandise which displays their likeness.17  The 
court found that the right of publicity would only have value if it could be 
the subject of an exclusive grant—unlike the right of privacy, which cannot 
be assigned or transferred.18 
B. Right of Publicity is Descendible to Heirs Regardless of whether the 
Celebrity Exploited the Right while Alive 
More than twenty years later, the widows of Stanley Laurel and Oliver 
Hardy sued Hal Roach Studios, which owned the copyright to the Laurel 
and Hardy films, alleging misappropriation of the names and likeness of 
the two deceased comedians for commercial merchandising purposes.19  
The Price court held that Laurel and Hardy had a property right in their 
names and likeness during their lifetime and that the right descended to 
their heirs whether or not they exploited the right during their lifetimes.20  
This was the first expansion of the right of publicity beyond the celebrities‘ 
lifetime. 
C. Early Judicial Limitations on Descendible Rights of Publicity 
Four years after the district court in New York decided Price, which 
recognized a descendible right of publicity for heirs regardless of whether 
the celebrity exploited the right while alive, the California Supreme Court 
reached a very different conclusion.21  In 1966, the son and widow of Bela 
Lugosi filed a complaint against Universal Studios, claiming that Lugosi 
had a protectable property or proprietary right in his likeness of the Count 
 
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 14 Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).  In 1972, California added privacy to the 
inalienable rights granted to all people under the California Constitution.  ―All people are by nature free 
and independent and have inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, 
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and priva-
cy.‖  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended Nov. 7, 1972, to add the word, ―privacy‖). 
 15 Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826 n.15 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 16 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 
U.S. 816 (1953). 
 17 Id. at 868. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 20 Id. at 844, 846–47. 
 21 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979). 
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Dracula character which descended to his heirs under his will.22  Lugosi 
portrayed Count Dracula in a Broadway production and in the Universal 
films, Dracula,23 Dracula‟s Daughter,24 and Abbott and Costello Meet 
Frankenstein.25  Lugosi‘s heirs sought a share of the profits from Univer-
sal‘s licensing of Lugosi‘s image as the character Count Dracula.26 
In 1960, four years after his death, Universal began to license the use 
of Lugosi‘s image as the Count Dracula character.27  Universal granted 
more than fifty licenses over the next decade for the use of the character‘s 
image in the sale of a wide variety of products, including: ―plastic toy pen-
cil sharpeners, plastic model figures, T-shirts and sweat shirts, card games, 
soap and detergent products, picture puzzles, candy dispensers, masks, 
kites, belts and belt buckles, and beverage stirring rods.‖28 
The California Supreme Court denied the claims of Lugosi‘s heirs, not 
because Lugosi had contracted with Universal to exploit his Dracula image, 
but because ―the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to the artist 
and must be exercised, if at all, by him during his lifetime.‖29  Lugosi‘s 
heirs may have received a descendible right of publicity ―if [the right] had 
been crystallized into a business by Lugosi during his lifetime‖ such that 
his name or likeness was used ―in connection with any business, product, 
or service so as to impress a secondary meaning of such business, product, 
or service.‖30 
Four days after the Lugosi decision, the California Supreme Court 
again concluded that rights of publicity were not descendible under Cali-
fornia law unless exploited during the celebrity‘s lifetime.31  Rudolph ―Ru-
dolpho‖ Valentino‘s nephew and legal heir, Jean Guglielmi, filed suit seek-
ing damages and injunctive relief claiming that defendant Spelling-
Goldberg Productions misappropriated Valentino‘s right of publicity by 
producing a biographical film.32  Guglielmi, citing Lugosi as controlling, 
held that ―the right of publicity protects against the unauthorized use of 
one‘s name, likeness or personality, but that the right is not descendible and 
expires upon the death of the person so protected.‖33 
 
 22 Id. at 427. 
 23 DRACULA (Universal Pictures 1931). 
 24 DRACULA‘S DAUGHTER (Universal Pictures 1936).  It should be noted that Bela Lugosi did not 
play an actual role in the film, however he gave permission to display in the film a wax image of his 
face and head as Count Dracula.  Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 434. 
 25 BUD ABBOTT & LOU COSTELLO MEET FRANKENSTEIN (Universal International Pictures 1948). 
 26 Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 427. 
 27 Id. at 435. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 431. 
 30 Id. at 428 & n.5. 
 31 Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979). 
 32 Id. at 455. 
 33 Id. 
HELLER 11/20/2008 5:18 PM 
2008] The Deceased Celebrity Business 549 
II.  CODIFICATION OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
A. California Creates a Statutory Right of Publicity for the Living 
While the Lugosi case was moving through the courts at glacial speed, 
the California legislature created a statutory right of publicity, available to 
everyone, regardless of celebrity status, which terminates upon death.34  
The statute, California Civil Code section 3344, prohibits ―knowingly‖ us-
ing a person‘s ―name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any 
manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of adver-
tising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise,  goods 
or services,‖ without prior consent.35  The statute created an exemption for 
―news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political cam-
paign,‖36 and provides for both monetary damages and attorney fees.37 
The Lugosi court explained that section 3344 ―fills a gap which exists 
in the common law tort of invasion of privacy in the state of California[,]‖38 
adding that ―it is consistent with the common law limitation on the right to 
privacy for the statute not to provide for an action by one‘s heirs.‖39 
B. New York Federal Courts Follow California‘s Lead 
The District Court in New York looked to the Lugosi case when 
Groucho Marx Productions—assignee of the Marx Brothers—sued the 
producers of a Broadway play for interference with their publicity rights.40  
The play, A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine, included three prin-
cipal performers reproducing the appearance and comedy style of the Marx 
Brothers‘.41  Following the holding of Lugosi, the District Court concluded 
that the Marx Brothers‘ right of publicity was properly asserted because 
they had exploited their rights in their self-created characters during their 
lifetime.42 
C. California Reacts to Lugosi by Creating a Statutory Right of Publicity 
for the Dead 
In response to Lugosi and Groucho Marx Productions, the California 
legislature—prompted by the Screen Actors Guild, celebrities, and heirs of 
deceased celebrities—vested a right of publicity in celebrities‘ heirs by 
 
 34 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344  (West 2008). 
 35 Id. § 3344(a). 
 36 Id. § 3344(d). 
 37 Id. § 3344(a). 
 38 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 443 n.23 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis in original) (quot-
ing Letter from John Vasconcellos, Cal. State Assembly, to Ronald Reagan, Governor, Cal. (Nov. 10, 
1971)). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 41 Id. at 486. 
 42 Id. at 491–92 (further holding that commercial exploitation does not necessarily require con-
nection with the operation of a business or the sale of a particular product or service). 
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enacting Civil Code section 990.43  With automatically vesting rights, heirs 
no longer needed to overcome the Lugosi requirement of showing that pub-
licity rights were exploited during the decedent‘s lifetime.  This new statute 
was opposed by the American Civil Liberties Union, as well as copyright 
holders, including the Motion Picture Association of America, the Alliance 
of Motion Picture and Television Producers, CBS, NBC, and Ron Smith‘s 
Celebrity Look-Alikes.44 
Section 990 granted the heirs and transferees of a ―deceased personali-
ty‖ the right to consent to the use of the name, photograph, or likeness on 
or in products, or in advertisements for products for fifty years after the in-
dividual‘s death.45  ―Deceased personality‖ is defined as someone who died 
after 1935 and whose name or personality had commercial value at the time 
of his death.46  The law retroactively created ―property rights,‖ freely trans-
ferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of trust or testamentary 
documents.47  If the decedent did not sign a will or other transfer document, 
section 990 clarified the order in which surviving heirs—including spouse, 
children, grandchildren, and parents—inherit the rights.48  If none of the 
specified heirs remain, the publicity rights permanently enter the public 
domain.49 
While section 990 reflected the legislature‘s narrow focus on prevent-
ing courts from following the Lugosi and Groucho Marx decisions, it left 
courts to face the difficulty of interpreting section 990‘s language.50 
III.  COMPARING SECTION 990‘S POSTMORTEM RIGHTS TO 
SECTION 3344‘S PUBLICITY RIGHTS FOR THE LIVING 
When section 990 was enacted, deceased celebrities enjoyed a broader 
set of publicity rights than afforded to the living.  In some aspects, the dif-
ferences were distinct: Heirs of deceased celebrities possessed a ―freely 
transferable and enforceable property right‖ in the use of the deceased per-
sonality‘s likeness,51 while section 3344 contains no language granting 
transferable property rights to living celebrities.  A living celebrity is re-
quired to prove that a defendant ―knowingly‖ used the living person‘s 
 
 43 CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 2008) (renumbered 3344.1 in 1999). 
 44 Stephen F. Rohde, Dracula: Still Undead, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1985, at 51, 53. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(h) (West 2008) (superceded by section 3344.1).  Section 990 was 
amended in 1999 and renumbered as § 3344.1.  See infra Part VI.B. 
 50 Heirs were granted postmortem publicity rights under Section 990 if the deceased personality‘s 
―name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of his or her death.‖  
CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(h) (West 2008).  The statute provides no further direction on how ―commercial 
value‖ is to be determined, nor did it suggest how to determine the existence of unused commercial val-
ue. 
 51 Id. § 990. 
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name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness,52 while section 990 pro-
vided liability without proof of knowledge regarding the unlicensed use.53 
The difference in scope of protection—for the living in section 3344 
and the deceased in section 990—allows heirs to enforce publicity rights 
that the living celebrity would not have possessed.  For example, a living 
person whose image is captured as part of a photograph cannot seek dam-
ages under section 3344 unless they are represented in the photograph as an 
individual ―rather than solely as members of a definable group‖ such as a 
―crowd at any sporting event, a crowd in any street or public building, the 
audience at any theatrical or stage production, a glee club, or a baseball 
team.‖54  But section 990 merely required that the deceased personality is 
―readily identifiable from a photograph when one who views the photo-
graph with the naked eye can reasonably determine who the person de-
picted in the photograph is.‖55 
A living baseball player could not prohibit the commercial use of his 
image in a team photograph under section 3344, nor could a well-known 
celebrity prohibit the commercial use of his image depicting him in a 
crowd at a sporting event.56  But their heirs would be able to deny commer-
cial use of the same photograph by withholding consent under section 990. 
IV.  REFINEMENT OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS AFTER SECTION 3344 AND 
SECTION 990 
After the California legislature enacted postmortem publicity rights in 
section 990, still-living celebrities continued to pursue their publicity rights 
in court.  But the courts looked to the common law, rather than section 
3344, as the source of publicity rights for the living.  As a result, California 
common law publicity rights continued to expand in scope and became 
more clearly defined.57 
 
 52 If a plaintiff is unable to prove a ―knowing‖ use of name or likeness, the court will not find a 
violation of California Civil Code section 3344.  See White v Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 
1992).  Without a section 3344 violation, the living must look to a common law right of publicity for 
relief.  See Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 306 n.97 (2003). 
 53 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(1) (West 2008). 
 54 Id. § 3344(b)(2). 
 55 Id. § 990. 
 56 See, e.g., Tim Buckley, Jazz Run Out of Gas in L.A., DESERET MORNING NEWS, Nov. 5, 2007, 
http://deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695224968,00.html (depicting Jack Nicholson in the crowd at a 
basketball game). 
 57 Alain J. Lapter, How the Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford, 15 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 260 (2007) (―Unlike the traits enumerated under § 3344(a), the common 
law right of publicity embraces an expansive, yet ultimately ambiguous, set of indicia.  It is precisely 
the court‘s plaintiff-generous extension of protectable indicia that has significantly expanded a celebri-
ty‘s exclusive right to control the commercial use of his identity.‖). 
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A. Distinguishing Between Common Law and Statutory Rights of 
Publicity 
The actor, Clint Eastwood sued The National Enquirer for commercial 
appropriation of his name, photograph and likeness under both California 
common law and section 3344.58  Because section 3344(a) ―requires a 
knowing use [of the celebrity‘s likeness] whereas under case law, mistake 
and inadvertence are not a defense against commercial appropriation. . .and 
section 3344(g) expressly provides that its remedies are cumulative and in 
addition to any provided for by law[,]‖ the Eastwood court viewed section 
3344 as the legislative compliment to—and not the source of—the right of 
publicity.59  The Eastwood court also noted that a section 3344 claim re-
quired allegations of a ―direct . . . connection . . . between the [infringing] 
use and the commercial purpose.‖60 
B. Further Expansion of the Right of Publicity 
Courts further expanded common law publicity rights to include imita-
tions of a professional singer‘s distinctive voice for commercial purposes,61 
as well as any symbols that might ―evoke‖ a celebrity‘s identity for com-
mercial gain, such as a futuristic robot version of a game show hostess in 
an advertising context.62  Although a person may have abandoned his birth 
name by legally changing it, and commercial use of the previous name was 
abandoned, the courts still recognized a right of publicity in the use of the 
name.63  Courts also expanded the meaning of ―name and likeness‖ to en-
compass ―attributes‖ which suggest a celebrity‘s identity.64 
Not all celebrities were successful in persuading the court that com-
mon law or section 3344 afforded them a remedy when their likeness was 
commercially exploited.65  The ―public affairs‖ exemption of section 
3344(d) permitted the use of an individual‘s name and image in a commer-
cial video about famous surfers,66 as well as the use of a singer‘s voice in a 
 
 58 Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 59 Id. at 346 & n.6 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 60 Id. at 347 (internal quotations omitted). 
 61 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Waits v. Frito-Lay, 
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 62 White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 63 Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 64 See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (held 
print advertisement featuring race car identifiable as the plaintiff's as a use of his identity, even though 
the plaintiff himself was not visible in the ad); Carson v. Here‘s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 
831 (6th Cir. 1983) (held that a phrase commonly used to introduce a specific celebrity was protected). 
 65 See, e.g., Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1995) (cele-
brity‘s image originally used for newsworthy purposes, may be used to advertise the periodical itself); 
Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1994) (use of a celebrity‘s name for a character in a Tele-
vision series was an acceptable use); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC., Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 
2001) (picture in magazine was not pure commercial speech, and thus was protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 66 Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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pay-per-call opinion poll.67 
The California Legislature largely ignored these judicial refinements 
of publicity rights for the living.  But, when the publicity rights of the de-
ceased were called into question, the legislature acted quickly by amending 
section 990.68 
V.  THE CASE OF FRED ASTAIRE‘S IMAGE 
A. The Courts Limit Postmortem Publicity Rights by Recognizing an 
Exception to Section 990 for Non-Abusive Video 
In 1969, Fred Astaire granted the Ronby Corporation an exclusive li-
cense to use his name, pictures, and likeness in connection with the opera-
tion of dance studios, schools, and related activities.69  Fred Astaire died in 
1987, leaving control over the rights to his film clips to his widow.70  Two 
years later, Ronby entered into an agreement with Best Film & Video Corp. 
to manufacture and distribute a series of dance videos using the Fred As-
taire Dance Studios name and licenses.71  The ―Fred Astaire Dance Series‖ 
videos began with ninety second clips from two of Astaire‘s films and con-
tained still photographs of Astaire.72  Astaire‘s widow sued Best, claiming 
that the ninety second film clips violated her rights under section 990.73 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the ―fairly convoluted 
statutory scheme‖ of section 990, reasoning that ―to exempt a film or tele-
vision program but not a videotape creates an absurd result . . . .‖74  The 
court concluded that ―the only interpretation of [section 990‘s] plain lan-
guage which is internally consistent and gives effect to each phrase and 
clause of the provisions leads to the conclusion that Best‘s use of the As-
taire film clips is exempt.‖75  After reviewing the legislative history of sec-
tion 990, the court determined that ―Best‘s use in no possible way subjects 
Fred Astaire to abuse or ridicule.  Best‘s use is also nothing like the ex-
ploitative marketing uses described in these legislative staff reports.‖76 
It took less than two years for the California legislature to express its 
disapproval of Astaire.  The response, SB 209, was unambiguously titled 
the Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act.77 
 
 67 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ‘g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 68 Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 69 Id. at 1299. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 1301. 
 75 Id. at 1302. 
 76 Id. at 1303. 
 77 S.B. 209, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). 
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B. The Legislature Responds to the Judicial Limitation on Postmortem 
Publicity Rights 
According to its author, the Astaire Celebrity Protection Act (―Astaire 
Act‖) was necessary ―to correct [an] inappropriate application of the cur-
rent law[,]‖78 to close ―loopholes[,]‖79 and ―to provide greater protections 
to the heirs of deceased celebrities by broadening the right to publicity that 
is descendible to them.‖80  The source of the legislation was the Screen Ac-
tors Guild,81 and the same cast of characters from the section 990 debate, 
returned to lobby over the Astaire Act.82 
Proponents reiterated the state goals of section 990, stating that the 
amendments were necessary ―to correct inappropriate application of the 
current law to help prevent the improper use of celebrities‘ hard-earned im-
ages once they are no longer here to protect them themselves.‖83  The pro-
ponents also emphasized the Astaire Act‘s goal of protecting celebrities‘ 
images and concern for the widows, children and dependants: 
We are living in an era when images of prominent artists, living and deceased, 
are used to sell and promote an increasing variety of products in every conceiva-
ble medium at a time when advancing technology provides the means for virtual-
ly unlimited manipulation of images and their instantaneous distribution.  When 
image thieves step in, there is no limit to the extent of the damage that can be 
done to the integrity of (an artist‘s) career and vision. . . .  Not only do authorized 
users suffer by this theft, but owners of the rights lose important compensation, 
on which many heirs—widows, children and others—depend on to live.84 
Despite such lofty goals, the Astaire Act made only four changes in 
section 990.  First it amended section 990(n)—used by the Astaire court to 
determine that the dance video fell within the excluded category of 
―film‖85—by adding that films are not excluded from liability ―if the clai-
mant proves that the use is so directly connected with a product, article of 
merchandise, good, or service as to constitute an act of advertising, selling, 
or soliciting purchase of that product, article of merchandise, good, or ser-
vice by the deceased personality.‖86 
Second, the Astaire Act added twenty years of additional protection, 
extending control over postmortem publicity rights to seventy years beyond 
the date of death.87  On the front end, the Astaire Act extended the reach of 
 
 78 S.B. 209, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal.) (as amended and reported on Sept. 1, 1999). 
 79 Id. (mentioning Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp. as an example of the need for the Bill). 
 80 Id. 
 81 S.B. 209, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal.) (as amended and reported by S. Rules Comm. on Mar. 
3, 1999). 
 82 See id. 
 83 S.B. 209, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal.) (as amended and reported on Sept. 1, 1999). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp. 116 F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 86 S.B. 209, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal.) (as amended and reported on Sept. 1, 1999); see also 
CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3344.1(n) (West Supp. 2008). 
 87 See CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3344.1(f)(3) (West Supp. 2008). 
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its protection to include celebrities who died at any time after 1915.88 
Third, it extended California law, permitting plaintiffs to sue when 
―the liability, damages, and other remedies arise from acts occurring direct-
ly in [California,]‖89 or for a prohibited ―use, on or in products, merchan-
dise, goods, or services, or the advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases 
of, products, merchandise, goods, or services . . . .‖90 
Fourth, the Astaire Act renumbered and moved section 990 to section 
3344.1 so that the postmortem publicity statute would immediately follow 
the statute granting publicity rights to living persons.91 
Although the Astaire Act was enacted in California with very little 
opposition, similar legislation introduced in New York engendered criti-
cism.  The attorney for Time, Inc. argued that ―the wrong that these bills 
appear to redress is that the heirs of celebrities evidently do not feel that 
they are getting enough money for the use of the persona of their famous 
ancestors, . . . the name of the game here is money.‖92  Opponents of the 
legislation acknowledged that Astaire‘s estate prevented the unlicensed 
commercial use of Astaire‘s image on products such as jewelry, cologne, 
and tuxedos.93  But they derided the estate‘s granting of a license to digital-
ly remove Fred Astaire‘s dance partner, Ginger Rogers, from a film clip 
and to replace her with a Dirt Devil vacuum cleaner in a commercial.94  
This commercial exploitation raised particular ire because the estate had 
previously prevented the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts from us-
ing Fred Astaire clips for its televised tribute to Ginger Rogers in 1992.95  
Filmmakers who create documentaries and anthologies also complained 
about the difficulty involved with obtaining permission from the Astaire 
estate, despite their position that their work was not ―commercial‖ and 
therefore exempt.96  Though never enacted, critics of the New York legisla-
tion raised the concern that new postmortem protections would create ―im-
possible restrictions for photographers or artists selling their work.‖97 
 
 88 Id. § 3344.1(h).  Previously postmortem protection only reached celebrities who had died after 
1935.  See supra text accompanying note 46. 
 89 CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3344.1(n) (West Supp. 2008). 
 90 Id. 
 91  S.B. 209, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal.) (as amended and reported by S. Rules Comm. on Mar. 
3, 1999). 
 92 Adam Z. Horvath, Heirs Dispute Rights to Celebrity, NEWSDAY (New York), May 16, 1989, at 
N8. 
 93 Irene Lacher, Fred is Her Co-Pilot, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at C1. 
 94 See Eileen, Clarke, The Last Dance: When Fred Astaire, Died 12 Years Ago, The Battle over 
his Work Began, ENT. WKLY., June 18, 1999, at 88, available at http://www.ew.com/ew/ 
article/0,,273770,00.html. 
 95 Id.  ―The licensing and use of dead celebrities‘ images has been controversial for decades.  
There was a public debate in the late 1990s when movie images of John Wayne were digitally inserted 
into a Coors beer commercial after his death.‖  Patrick McGreevy, A Bid to Protect Stars‟ Images, L.A. 
TIMES, July 23, 2007, at B1. 
 96 Lacher, supra note 93. 
 97 Adam Z. Horvath, Heirs Dispute Rights to Celebrity, NEWSDAY (New York), May 16, 1989, at 
N8. 
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VI.  THE CASE OF MARILYN MONROE‘S IMAGES 
Marilyn Monroe‘s image was captured by some of the greatest photo-
graphers of her time, including Milton Greene, Tom Kelley, and Sam 
Shaw. Those images remain part of popular culture more than forty-five 
years after her death.  During her life, Monroe transferred her rights in the 
photos to the photographers by signing a modeling release.  The copyright 
to these images currently belongs to the photographers‘ estates, and the es-
tates license the use of the Monroe photographs.  But the holders of Mo-
nroe‘s postmortem publicity rights require the payment of an additional li-
cense fee—a second rent—whenever Monroe‘s photographs are 
commercially used.98 
When Marilyn Monroe died in August 1962, she left a 623-word will 
which provided for her mother and a few others.99  The will then included 
the following residuary clause: 
All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal of what-
soever nature and whatsoever situate, of which I shall die seized or possessed or 
to which I shall be in any way entitled, or over which I shall possess any power 
of appointment by Will at the time of my death, including any lapsed legacies, I 
give, devise and bequeath as follows: 
(a) To MAY REIS the sum of $40,000 or 25% of the total remainder of my es-
tate, whichever shall be the lesser. 
(b) To DR. MARIANNE KRIS 25% of the balance thereof, to be used by her as 
set forth in ARTICLE FIFTH (d) of this my Last Will and Testament. 
(c) To LEE STRASBERG the entire remaining balance.100 
Six years after Monroe‘s death, her acting coach, Lee Strasberg, mar-
ried Anna Strasberg—who was left as the sole beneficiary under Stras-
berg‘s will when he died in 1982.101  Monroe‘s will was subject to probate 
in New York County Surrogate‘s Court, which appointed Anna Strasberg, a 
woman Monroe likely never even knew, as the administratrix of her es-
tate.102  In 2001, the court authorized Anna Strasberg to close the estate and 
transfer the residuary assets to Marilyn Monroe, LLC—a Delaware compa-
ny formed by Ms. Strasberg to hold and manage the intellectual property 
assets of the residuary beneficiaries of Monroe‘s will.103 
 
 98 See Nathan Koppel, Blonde Ambitions: A Battle Erupts Over the Right to Market Marilyn, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at A1. 
 99 Strasberg v. Odyssey Group, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474, 475 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 100 See infra, Appendix A. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id.  After her husband, Lee‘s death, Anna Strasberg promptly auctioned the bulk of the items 
Monroe willed to Lee—for about $13.4 million dollars.  See Koppel, supra note 98 (―In 1999, Ms. 
Strasberg commissioned auction house Christie‘s to sell many famous items Ms. Monroe left behind, 
including the sequined gown she wore when she sang ‗Happy Birthday‘ to President John Kennedy in 
1962.  The auction raised $13.4 million, but the sale irked many of Ms. Monroe‘s fans and friends.‖). 
 103 See id. (―[Ms. Strasberg] has a controlling interest in [Marilyn Monroe, LLC]; the Anna Freud 
Centre, a London psychiatric institute that inherited Dr. Kris‘s stake [in the Monroe‘s estate] owns the 
rest.‖). 
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A. Courts in New York Limit the Extent of Postmortem Rights 
Marilyn Monroe, LLC and its licensing agent, CMG Worldwide, 
claim the postmortem right of publicity to Monroe‘s image and have as-
serted that right in connection with the licenses granted by the photograph-
er‘s estates.104  In 2005, Marilyn Monroe, LLC and CMG Worldwide 
brought action against certain photographers, their estates, and their agents 
in the Southern District of Indiana.105  Indiana, home to CMG, ―creates a 
descendible and freely transferable right of publicity that survives for 100 
years after a personality‘s death.‖106  Indiana jurisdiction is established 
when the deceased‘s likeness is used in any ―act or event that occurs within 
Indiana, regardless of a personality‘s domicile, residence, or citizenship.‖107 
Shortly thereafter, the Shaw Family Archives brought suit in the 
Southern District of New York ―seeking a declaratory judgment on whether 
there is any postmortem right of privacy or publicity in the name, likeness, 
and image of Marilyn Monroe . . . .‖108  The Archives also sought damages 
for copyright violations, tortious interference with contractual relations, 
and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.109 
The two cases were consolidated in the Southern District of New 
York, which held that a postmortem right of publicity could not have been 
passed by will in 1962 because ―only property actually owned by a testator 
at the time of her death can be devised by will.‖110  While Indiana recog-
nized postmortem publicity rights by the time of trial, neither Indiana nor 
Monroe‘s two possible states of domicile111 ―recognized descendible post-
mortem publicity rights at the time of Ms. Monroe‘s death in 1962 . . . .‖112 
Because ―the majority rule that the law of the domicile of the testator 
at his or her death applies to all questions of a will‘s construction[,]‖113 and 
neither California nor New York allowed for the transfer of postmortem 
publicity rights inherited through wills of personalities who were already 
deceased prior to the statute‘s enactment, the Shaw Family Archives court 
concluded that, although state law might grant Monroe‘s postmortem right 
of publicity  to her statutorily specified heirs, the purported transferees 
 
 104 Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d 309. 
 105 Id. at 310. 
 106 Id. at 313. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 310.  New York law does not recognize any common law right of publicity and limits its 
statutory publicity rights to living persons.  Id. at 314. 
 109 Id. at 310–11. 
 110 Id. at 313–14. 
 111 See id. at 314–15 (―There are disputed issues of fact concerning whether Ms. Monroe was do-
miciled in New York or California at the time of her death. (There is absolutely no doubt that she was 
not domiciled in Indiana.)‖). 
 112 Id. at 314. 
 113 Id. 
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could not, and did not, hold such a right.114 
B. Courts in California Limit the Extent of Postmortem Rights 
The estate of a second Monroe photographer, Milton H. Greene Arc-
hives, Inc. (―MHG‖), filed a contemporaneous action against CMG 
Worldwide, Marilyn Monroe, LLC, and Anna Strasberg in the Central Dis-
trict Court of California.115  The court granted MHG‘s motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that ―under either California or New York law, Ma-
rilyn Monroe had no testamentary capacity to devise, through the residual 
clause of her will, statutory rights of publicity that were not created until 
decades after her death . . . .‖116  The court further concluded that, ―even if 
Marilyn Monroe‘s estate was open at the time the statutory rights of public-
ity were created, it ‗was not [an] entity capable of holding title to the 
rights.‘‖117 
To reach this decision, the court examined California Civil Code sec-
tion 3344.1, finding that ―[g]iven the clear common law prescription that a 
testator cannot devise property not owned at the time of death, and the pre-
sumption that the California legislature knew of this . . . prescription . . . 
[with respect to] personalities who died before its enactment, the California 
right of publicity statute vested the posthumous publicity right in designat-
ed heirs rather than in the ‗personality‘ himself or herself.‖118  Because sec-
tion 3344.1 ―did not reveal a legislative intent that was contrary to general 
principles of property and probate law,‖ Marilyn Monroe, LLC and CMG 
Worldwide lacked standing to assert postmortem publicity rights.119While 
limiting the extent of postmortem publicity rights, the Milton Greene court 
noted that the California and Indiana legislatures were in no way prohibited 
―from enacting a right of publicity statute that vested the right directly in 
the residuary beneficiaries of a deceased personality‘s estate, or in the suc-
cessors-in-interest of those residuary beneficiaries.‖120 
C. Legislative Response to the Monroe Limitation on Postmortem Rights 
A scant six weeks after the Central District‘s ruling, California State 
Senator Sheila Kuehl fast-tracked Senate Bill 771.121  The bill, sponsored 
by the Screen Actors Guild, was meant to amend section 3344.1 in re-
 
 114 Id. at 315–20. 
 115 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 05-02200 MMM (MCx), 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22213 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008). 
 116 Id. at *10. 
 117 Id. (brackets in original). 
 118 Id. at *6–7. 
 119 Id. at *7. 
 120 Id. at *9. 
 121 Id.  State Senator Sheila Kuehl (D-Santa Monica) also starred in the 1959–63 CBS Series, The 
Many Loves of Dobie Gillis.  Matthew Belloni, Marilyn‟s Image Fuels Right-of-Publicity Row, 
HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 14–16, 2007, at 90. 
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sponse to the recent Monroe cases.122  In September 2007, Senate Bill 771 
passed both houses of the California legislature and was signed by Gover-
nor Schwarzenegger on October 10, 2007.123 
According to the proponents of SB 771, it clarifies that the rights to ―a 
deceased personality‘s name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness in a 
commercial product is freely descendible by means of trust or any other 
testamentary instrument executed before or after January 1, 1985.‖124  The 
Bill also specifies that the publicity rights are deemed to have existed at the 
time of death of any person who died prior to 1985, and that such property 
rights vest in the persons entitled to them under a trust or other testamenta-
ry instrument of the deceased personality.125  A provision in the testamenta-
ry instrument disposing of the residue of the deceased personality‘s assets 
shall be effective to transfer those assets—including publicity rights—as of 
the date of death.126 
SB 771 amended section 3344.1(b)—which vested postmortem pub-
licity rights in the family members identified in the statute—and substituted 
the following: 
The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transferable or 
descendible, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of any trust or any other 
testamentary instrument, executed before or after January 1, 1985.  The rights 
recognized under this section shall be deemed to have existed at the time of death 
of any deceased personality who died prior to January 1, 1985, and, except as 
provided in subdivision (o), shall vest in the persons entitled to these property 
rights under the testamentary instrument of the deceased personality effective as 
of the date of his or her death. In the absence of an express transfer in a testamen-
tary instrument of the deceased personality‘s rights in his or her name, voice, 
signature, photograph, or likeness, a provision in the testamentary instrument that 
provides for the disposition of the residue of the deceased personality‘s assets 
shall be effective to transfer the rights recognized under this section in accor-
dance with the terms of that provision.  The rights established by this section 
shall also be freely transferable or descendible by contract, trust, or any other tes-
tamentary instrument by any subsequent owner of the deceased personality‘s 
rights as recognized by this section.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
render invalid or unenforceable any contract entered into by a deceased personal-
ity during his or her lifetime by which the deceased personality assigned the 
rights, in whole or in part, to use his or her name, voice, signature, photograph or 
likeness, regardless of whether the contract was entered into before or after Janu-
 
 122 Post-Mortem Publicity Rights of Deceased Celebrities: Hearing on S.B. 771 Before the S. 
Rules Comm. Assemb., 2007–08 Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. Sept. 4, 2007).  In addition to the Screen Actors 
Guild, the bill was supported by California Labor Federation, AFSCME, Motion Picture and Television 
Fund, and about a dozen celebrity heirs and their foundations.  The only opposition came from photo-
graphers and their estates.  Id. at 5–6. 
 123 Milton Greene, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9. 
 124 Id. at 2. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
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ary 1, 1985.127 
SB 771 also added the following subsection to section 3344.1: 
(o) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, if an action was 
taken prior to May 1, 2007, to exercise rights recognized under this section relat-
ing to a deceased personality who died prior to January 1, 1985, by a person de-
scribed in subdivision (d), other than a person who was disinherited by the de-
ceased personality in a testamentary instrument, and the exercise of those rights 
was not challenged successfully in a court action by a person described in subdi-
vision (b), that exercise shall not be affected by subdivision (b). In such a case, 
the rights that would otherwise vest in one or more persons described in subdivi-
sion (b) shall vest solely in the person or persons described in subdivision (d), 
other than a person disinherited by the deceased personality in a testamentary in-
strument, for all future purposes. 
(p) The rights recognized by this section are expressly made retroactive, includ-
ing to those deceased personalities who died before January 1, 1985.128 
Individual photographers, their estates, and photography organizations 
opposed the bill.  They argued that, prior to SB 771, publicity rights des-
cend to designated heirs, and that SB 771 ―strips those family members of 
deceased personalities of the rights they have owned and enjoyed for 22 
years, without notice, compensation or justification.  The Amendment is 
therefore unconstitutional both because of its attempted retroactive effect 
and because it deprives persons of their property ex post facto without 
compensation.‖129  Opponents also argued that SB 771 vests rights in resid-
uary beneficiaries which, under the previous law, would have fallen into 
the public domain upon death unless the statutory heirs were alive.130 
D. Courts Apply the New Legislation 
Following the passage of SB 771, the U.S District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California granted a motion for reconsideration of the Milton 
Greene decision.131  Citing SB 771 and its legislative history, the court 
stated that ―[i]t is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the summary 
judgment orders‖ in Milton Greene and Shaw Family Archives.132  The 
court agreed with statements by Senator Kuehl that SB 771 was a legisla-
tive ―clarification‖ rather than a change or modification in existing law.133  
The court concluded that Marilyn Monroe, LLC has standing to assert the 
right of publicity under the ―clarified‖ California law.134  As of January 
 
 127 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West 2008) (asterisks and underlining omitted). 
 128 Id. § 3344.1(o)–(p). 
 129 Letter from The Soni Law Firm, representing The Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. & Tom 
Kellery Studios, Inc., to Senator Bob Margett, California Senate 2 (Sept. 7, 2007) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Soni Letter] (emphasis omitted). 
 130 Id. at 3. 
 131 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 05-02200 MMM (MCx), 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22213 (D. Cal. 2008). 
 132  Id. at *18 (brackets in original). 
 133 Id. at *14, *29. 
 134 Id. at *57–58. 
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2008, the only remaining issue before the court was the location of Marilyn 
Monroe‘s domicile at time of death. If Monroe was domiciled in California, 
SB 771 granted her the retroactive testamentary power to bequeath a post-
humous right of publicity through her will.135  If domiciled in New York, 
her publicity rights would derive exclusively from statute—personal to the 
individual and extinguishing at death.136 
VII.  POSTMORTEM PUBLICITY RIGHTS: A GROWTH INDUSTRY 
A. Legislative Intent Behind the Enactment of Postmortem Publicity 
Rights 
The sponsors and proponents of California‘s postmortem publicity 
legislation have repeatedly stated that its purpose is to create a means of 
protecting a deceased celebrity‘s name or likeness from unseemly uses.  
The sponsors of the Astaire Celebrity Protection Act and SB 771 quoted 
the legislative history from the enactment of California‘s first postmortem 
publicity rights statute in 1984, which declared: 
[This] bill is intended to address circumstances in . . . which . . . a celebrity or 
public figure is subjected to abuse or ridicule in the form of a marketed product.  
Such goods or services typically involve[ ] the use of a deceased celebrity‘s 
name or likeness, e.g., on posters, T-shirts, porcelain plates, and other collec-
tibles; in toys, gadgets, and other merchandise; [or] in look-alike services.137 
California‘s first postmortem publicity law, enacted in 1984, vested 
postmortem publicity rights in specified family members, because the leg-
islature determined that close family members are most likely to be sensi-
tive to protecting a deceased celebrity‘s name and likeness from ―abuse or 
ridicule.‖138  Under this version of the law, if no close family members re-
mained, due to death, or the passage of fifty years, the rights fell into the 
public domain.139 
 
 135 Id. at *59–60; cf. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002).  Pursuant to Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 946, the Cairns court determined that postmortem publicity rights would exist 
if the decedent was resident of California or a resident of another jurisdiction that has similar postmor-
tem rights.  In Cairns, the trustee of the Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Fund sued a California 
based business that was selling a broad range of Princess Diana memorabilia without permission.  The 
Cairns court determined that, absent any contrary law in the local forum, the rights are based on the 
location of the rights-holder‘s residence, and not based on the location of the claimed violation.  Since 
neither the plaintiff trust nor the deceased person were California residents, and because the United 
Kingdom did not have a similar right of postmortem publicity, the court determined that section 3344.1 
was not violated.  Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1147. 
 136 Milton Greene, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22213 at *59–60. 
 137 Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Report on S.B. 613 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 1983–84 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1984) 
(statement of Cal. Sen. John Campbell) (as amended June 12, 1984), at 3–4 [hereinafter Report on S.B. 
613]). 
 138 See Commercial Appropriation of Image: Deceased Celebrities, Hearing on S.B. 209 Before S. 
Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (statements of Cal. Sen. John Burton) [hereinafter 
Burton Hearing]. 
 139 See Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800 (Cal. 2001) (describing the 
original fifty-year consent period following the death of a personality).  Under the current revised sta-
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Subsequent legislation vested publicity rights in the residuary clause 
of a celebrity‘s will unless a contrary intent is expressly stated in the 
will.140  Since an inheritable right of publicity did not even exist prior to 
1984, it is highly unlikely that it would be specifically bequeathed in wills 
drafted prior to that date, and therefore the rights will almost always pass to 
the residuary heirs.  By granting control of a celebrity‘s postmortem rights 
to the residuary heirs, assignees, and transferees for seventy years,141 the 
legislation almost ensures that the rights are eventually owned and con-
trolled by an individual or entity with very limited sensitivity to ―abuse or 
ridicule‖ of the celebrity‘s name and likeness. 
According to the Screen Actors Guild, ―In recent years, it has become 
increasingly important to protect [postmortem publicity] rights in the face 
of increasing avenues of commercial exploitation, while still taking care 
not to hamper the creative process.  The passage of SB 771 will help to 
protect these public figures while still allowing for creative expression.‖142  
Representatives of Marilyn Monroe, LLC assert that they have ―carefully 
guarded the publicity rights of Marilyn Monroe‘s image in order to main-
tain her legacy as she intended.  However, due to recent court decisions, 
Ms. Monroe‘s publicity rights could be released into the public domain on-
ly to result in offensive and exploitive uses of her image.‖143  The legisla-
tive sponsor of SB 771 noted that ―[d]igital technology now permits adver-
tisers to manipulate the images of dead people, like the infamous 1997 
commercial in which Fred Astaire danced with a vacuum cleaner.‖144 
B. Practical Effects of Granting Postmortem Publicity Rights 
While licensors have sued to prevent unlicensed (and therefore unpa-
id) uses, they have also sold licenses for a wide variety of goods and ser-
vices, including all of the items listed by legislative sponsors as typically 
subjecting a celebrity or public figure to ―abuse or ridicule.‖145  Legislators 
have specifically listed ―posters, T-shirts, porcelain plates,‖ ―toys, gad-
gets,‖ and ―other collectibles‖ as well as ―look alike services‖ as items with 
high potential for ridicule.146 
Perhaps the swift passage of SB 771 left little time for the legislature 
to look closely at the currently licensed uses of Monroe‘s image.  The web-
 
tute, the consent period lasts seventy years beyond the death of the personality.  See CAL. CIV. CODE  § 
3344.1(g) (West 2008). 
 140 Id. § 3344.1(b). 
 141 Id. § 3344.1(g). 
 142 Deceased Personalities: Transfer of Publicity Rights by Testamentary Instrument: Hearing on 
SB 771 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2007–08 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (statement of Cal. Sen. Sheila 
Kuehl) [hereinafter Kuehl Hearing], available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0751-
0800/sb_771_cfa_20070906_123814_sen_comm.html. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Jim Zarroli, Law Decides Who Owns a Dead Star‟s Image, NAT‘L PUB. RADIO, Oct. 11, 2007, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15198298. 
 145 See supra text accompanying note 137. 
 146 Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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site of Marilyn Monroe, LLC includes an ―official online store‖ which of-
fers a wide array of products containing her image, including: stemware, 
purses, candles, jewelry, T-Shirts, costumes, refrigerator magnets, stickers, 
swim suits, and a 5‘7‖ stand-up featur[ing] a famous 1950s image of Ma-
rilyn wearing net stockings, black heels and fitted bodice, leaning back on a 
table.‖147  The website‘s ―Licensing Resource Center‖ encourages prospec-
tive licensees to ―[b]uild your brand with Marilyn Monroe and maximize 
the appeal and demand for your product or service by incorporating the 
most famous Hollywood icon of all time.‖148 
According to CMG Worldwide‘s website, the company represents 
―over 200 diverse clients from all realms of stardom‖149 and offers to ―de-
velop successful licensing programs in a variety of categories including 
Apparel, Collectibles, Jewelry, Sporting Goods, Gourmet food, Gaming 
and Electronics, Restaurants and Toys just to name a few.‖150  While the 
postmortem publicity rights were intended to protect against abuse or ridi-
cule, it appears that Marilyn Monroe, LLC has considered licensing cele-
brity images for the very products and services that carry high potential for 
ridicule or abuse. 
Marilyn Monroe, LLC and its licensing company, CMG Worldwide, 
Inc., were before the California and New York courts as a result of their ef-
forts to prevent professional photographers and their estates from licensing 
the use of their copyrighted photographs without an additional license for 
the postmortem publicity rights.151  These cases involved the sale of a 
second license by the postmortem publicity rights holder, not prevention of 
abuse or ridicule. 
C. Alternate Goals of Postmortem Publicity Rights: Protecting Charities 
Another stated purpose of the law is to protect the income—in the 
form of licensing fees—of charities when a celebrity‘s will names the char-
ity as a residual beneficiary.152  The Milton Greene court expressed a simi-
lar concern, stating that it ―reached [its] conclusion with reluctance because 
some personalities who died before passage of the California and Indiana 
right of publicity statutes had left their residuary estates to charities[,] . . . 
[who] assumed that they controlled the personality‘s right of publicity 
 . . . .‖153  Denying the right would have the effect of divesting the charity 
 
 147 Marilyn Monroe‘s Official Website, http://www.marilynmonroe.com (describing the stand-up 
as ―[a]n unforgettable addition to any Marilyn collection!‖) (last visited  Mar. 27, 2008). 
 148 MarilynMonroe.com, http://business.marilynmonroe.com/licensing/index.htm (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2008). 
 149 CMG Woldwide Services, http://services.cmgww.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
 150 CMG Woldwide Services, http://services.cmgww.com/marketing/merchandise.htm (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2008). 
 151 See supra Part VII.A–B. 
 152  ―Kuehl also says that over the years, many celebrities have left their estates to nonprofit foun-
dations; the law ensures that they were within their rights to do so.‖  Zarroli, supra note 144. 
 153 Milton H. Greene Archives v. CMG Worldwide, No. CV 05-02200 MMM (MCx), 2008 U.S. 
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of the celebrity‘s posthumous right of publicity.154 
But neither the legislature nor the court provided examples of poten-
tially affected charities.  SB 771 addressed a similar concern with respect to 
family members—that they would retroactively lose rights—by carving out 
an exception for statutory heirs who have exercised a celebrity‘s right of 
publicity and who were never successfully challenged in court.155  The leg-
islature does not appear to have considered carving out a similar exception 
for charities or any other exculpatory measures like a grandfather clause. 
There appears to be one remaining goal for California‘s postmortem 
publicity laws. This goal has become the primary, and arguably, the only, 
focus of its sponsors and proponents: ―to address circumstances in which 
 . . . commercial gain is had through the exploitation of the name, voice, 
signature, photograph, or likeness of a celebrity or public figure in the mar-
keting of goods or services . . . .‖156 
D. Unresolved Issues Arising out of Publicity Rights 
In its rush to protect deceased celebrities, the California legislature ig-
nored or dismissed critics of the legislation and of existing law, and there-
fore missed an opportunity to address concerns and resolve issues. 
Courts repeatedly struggle with balancing the right of publicity and 
the First Amendment.  While some find that an artist‘s First Amendment 
right to paint a picture of Tiger Woods outweighs the right of publicity,157 
other courts have used a transformative test to find that an artist‘s charcoal 
drawing of the Three Stooges violated their postmortem publicity rights.158  
The Ninth Circuit has found that the publications are protected from right 
of publicity claims unless the ―publishers knew that their statements were 
false or published them in reckless disregard of the truth.‖159  Courts and 
commentators have repeatedly wrestled with the balance between the right 
to expressive speech that incorporates a celebrity‘s likeness and the right of 
publicity that grants control over the use of a celebrity‘s likeness.160 
 
Dist. LEXIS 22213, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008). 
 154 Id. 
 155 See CAL CIV. CODE § 3344.1(o) (West 2008). 
 156 Burton Hearing, supra note 138 (quoting Report on SB 613, supra note 137). 
 157 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ‘g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (held that artist‘s First 
Amendment right of expression in painting of Tiger Woods outweighed the golfer‘s publicity rights). 
 158 See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).  Artist Gary Sade-
rup drew the Three Stooges on canvass with charcoal and sold lithographs and T-shirts bearing repro-
ductions of his drawing.  The court looked to whether the new work was ―transformative‖ of the origi-
nal photograph, finding that if a work ―adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message;‖ then it is sufficiently transfor-
mative to garner its own protection.  Id. at 808.  In this case, the court found that Saderup‘s artwork was 
not transformative and therefore a violation of the right of publicity.  Id. at 811. 
 159 Cher v. Forum Int‘l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 
(1983). 
 160 See, e.g., Jordan Tabach-Bank, Note, Missing the Right of Publicity Boat: How Tyne v. Time 
Warner Entertainment Co. Threatens to “Sink” The First Amendment, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 247 
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Some commentators have cautioned against expanding publicity 
rights,161 and others have argued against postmortem publicity rights be-
cause the information—the likeness of the deceased celebrity—should be 
in the public domain.162  Other commentators have raised questions about 
the intersection of publicity rights and copyrights.163 
Another issue involves publicity rights in the context of the Internet.  
California‘s postmortem publicity rights statute does not clearly state what 
publicity rights exist online.164  A substantial number of Internet images are 
not involved in the advertising or sale of goods or services, and those that 
are, may fall into the excluded category of audiovisual work.165 
In enacting SB 771, California granted extended publicity rights pro-
tection retroactively by an additional twenty years.  But this new protection 
may affect pre-existing contracts and licenses.  Licensees of copyrighted 
material will presumably be required to obtain a second license.  If the li-
censee has invested in production and marketing, another publicity rights 
license could prove very costly.166  Finally, publicity rights that may have 
entered the public domain under the old laws may be resurrected as private 
property because of SB 771‘s retroactive grant.  Anyone utilizing such 
rights may be required to obtain a license. 
The California Legislature‘s rush to ―abrogate‖ the Monroe cases is 
not the first time a state legislature came to the rescue of celebrity estates.  
When the estate of Elvis Presley lost in court, the Tennessee Legislature 
responded by passing broad protections that last longer than in any other 
state—theoretically in perpetuity—so long as the publicity right is not 
abandoned.167 
Indiana, ―which is often considered the most aggressive and well-
defined statutory scheme in the United States,‖168 is home to CMG World-
wide, Inc.  The Indiana statute provides for a cause of action without regard 
for the plaintiff‘s or defendant‘s domicile if any infringing material is lo-
 
(2004); W. Mack Webner & Leigh Ann Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line Between Commer-
cial Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 AKRON L. REV. 171 (2004). 
 161 See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 52, at 296–97. 
 162 See, e.g., Jeremy T. Marr, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws, 44 B.C. 
L. REV. 863, 864–65 (2003). 
 163 See, e.g., Aaron A. Bartz, …And Where It Stops, Nobody Knows: California‟s Expansive Pub-
licity Rights Threaten the Federal Copyright System, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 299 (1997); Brown v. Ames, 
201 F.3d 654, 658–60 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that Congress did not intend to preempt); Toney v. 
L‘Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding publicity right preempted by copyright law). 
 164 See Pamela Lynn Kunath, Lights, Camera, Animate! The Right of Publicity‟s Effect on Com-
puter-Animated Celebrities, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 883 (1996). 
 165 See, e.g., id.; Joseph D. Schleimer, Problems Encountered in Protecting Living and Deceased 
Actors‟ „Virtual Rights‟, 16 ENT. L. & FIN., Oct. 2000, at 1; Thomas Glenn Martin Jr., Comment, Re-
birth and Rejuvenation in a Digital Hollywood: The Challenge Computer-Simulated Celebrities Present 
for California‟s Antiquated Right of Publicity, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 99, 101 (1996); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 166 See Soni Letter, supra note 129. 
 167 TENN. CODE  ANN. § 47-25-1104(b)(2) (Supp. 2001). 
 168 Lapter, supra note 57, at 259. 
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cated within Indiana,169 a provision used by CMG Worldwide to gain juris-
diction for the Monroe cases in Indiana.  California‘s statute affords plain-
tiffs similar reach, applying whenever 
the liability, damages, and other remedies arise from acts occurring directly in 
this state.  [A]cts giving rise to liability shall be limited to the use, on or in prod-
ucts, merchandise, goods, or services, or the advertising or selling, or soliciting 
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services . . . .170 
Perhaps, not surprisingly, as SB 771 was zipping through the legisla-
tive process in California, legislation was introduced in New York to create 
postmortem publicity rights for the first time.171  The bill would create 
rights for any person who died after 1938, and like Tennessee‘s law, con-
tinue unless abandoned.172  A pending New York bill would immediately 
make unlawful uses of a person‘s ―portrait, name, voice, signature or pic-
ture that are currently legal[,]‖ and prohibit use of a name or likeness even 
if it was authorized by the person before death.173 
CONCLUSION 
The owners and licensors of postmortem publicity rights have enjoyed 
legislative victories in key states, as each victory broadened the scope of 
their rights and strengthened available enforcement mechanisms.  While 
Indiana and California may become a plaintiff‘s venue of choice, some 
courts will continue to struggle with diverse and ambiguous state laws.  As 
a result, some, including the American Bar Association, recommend 
enactment of a federal publicity rights statute ―in order to curb significant 
forum shopping and to provide advertisers and celebrities with the precise 
boundaries of protection.‖174  The Internet, satellite television, and the 
growth of a global economy have called for an international copyright pro-
tection scheme within international intellectual property treaties.175 
If the postmortem publicity rights industry is as successful in a nation-
al and international arena as it has been in California, the $232 million 
earned by the thirteen top grossing dead celebrities in 2007 is only the be-
ginning of a very lucrative future. 
 
 169 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2006). 
 170 CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3344.1(n) (West Supp. 2008). 
 171 Mitchell M. Gans et al., Postmortem Rights of Publicity: The Federal Estate Tax Conse-
quences of New State-Law Property Rights, YALE L.J. ONLINE POCKET PART, Apr. 1, 2008, 
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2008/04/01/ganscrawfordblattmachr.html (―California recently passed 
legislation that creates retroactive, descendible rights of publicity.  The New York State Assembly is 
poised to enact similar legislation.‖). 
 172 Tennessee‘s right of publicity terminates upon proof of non-use in two of any ten years after 
the person‘s death.  TENN. CODE  ANN. § 47-25-1104(b)(2) (Supp. 2001). 
 173 Sara L. Edelman, Death Pays: The Fight Over Marilyn Monroe‟s Publicity Rights, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, July 2007, at 39. 
 174 Lapter, supra note 57, at 243; see also Marr, supra note 162, at 864; Symposium, Rights of 
Publicity: An In-depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposals to Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 209 (1998). 
 175 Lapter, supra note 57, at 244. 
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APPENDIX A: 
LAST WILL & TESTAMENT OF MARILYN MONROE
*
 
I, MARILYN MONROE, do make, publish and dec-
lare this to be my Last Will and Testament. 
FIRST: I hereby revoke all former Wills and Codi-
cils by me made. 
SECOND: I direct my Executor, hereinafter named, 
to pay all of my just debts, funeral expenses and testamen-
tary charges as soon after my death as can conveniently 
be done. 
THIRD: I direct that all succession, estate or inheritance taxes which 
may be levied against my estate and/or against any legacies and/or devises 
hereinafter set forth shall be paid out of my residuary estate. 
FOURTH: 
(a) I give and bequeath to BERNICE MIRACLE, should she survive 
me, the sum of $10,000.00. 
(b) I give and bequeath to MAY REIS, should she survive me, the sum 
of $10,000.00. 
(c) I give and bequeath to NORMAN and HEDDA ROSTEN, or to the 
survivor of them, or if they should both predecease me, then to their daugh-
ter, PATRICIA ROSTEN, the sum of $5,000.00, it being my wish that such 
sum be used for the education of PATRICIA ROSTEN. 
(d) I give and bequeath all of my personal effects and clothing to LEE 
STRASBERG, or if he should predecease me, then to my Executor herei-
nafter named, it being my desire that he distribute these, in his sole discre-
tion, among my friends, colleagues and those to whom I am devoted. 
FIFTH; I give and bequeath to my Trustee, hereinafter named, the sum 
of $100,000.00, in Trust, for the following uses and purposes: 
(a) To hold, manage, invest and reinvest the said property and to re-
ceive and collect the income therefrom. 
(b) To pay the net income therefrom, together with such amounts of 
principal as shall be necessary to provide $5,000.00 per annum, in equal 
quarterly installments, for the maintenance and support of my mother, 
GLADYS BAKER, during her lifetime. 
(c) To pay the net income therefrom, together with such amounts of 
principal as shall be necessary to provide $2,500.00 per annum, in equal 
quarterly installments, for the maintenance and support of MRS. 
 
* On file with N.Y. Surr. Ct., 4th Dist., available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ 
4jd/warren/surrogates_will_monroe.shtml. 
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MICHAEL CHEKHOV during her lifetime. 
(d) Upon the death of the survivor between my mother, GLADYS 
BAKER, and MRS. MICHAEL CHEKHOV to pay over the principal re-
maining in the Trust, together with any accumulated income, to DR. 
MARIANNE KRIS to be used by her for the furtherance of the work of 
such psychiatric institutions or groups as she shall elect. 
SIXTH: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and 
personal, of whatsoever nature and wheresoever situate, of which I shall die 
seized or possessed or to which I shall be in any way entitled, or over 
which I shall possess any power of appointment by Will at the time of my 
death, including any lapsed legacies, I give, devise and bequeath as fol-
lows: 
(a) to MAY REIS the sum of $40,000.00 or 25% of the total remaind-
er of my estate, whichever shall be the lesser, 
(b) To DR. MARIANNE KRIS 25% of the balance thereof, to be used 
by her as set forth in ARTICLE FIFTH (d) of this my Last Will and Testa-
ment. 
(c) To LEE STRASBERG the entire remaining balance. 
SEVENTH: I nominate, constitute and appoint AARON R. FROSCH 
Executor of this my Last Will and Testament. In the event that he should 
die or fail to qualify, or resign or for any other reason be unable to act, I 
nominate, constitute and appoint L. ARNOLD WEISSBERGER in his 
place and stead. 
EIGHTH: I nominate, constitute and appoint AARON R. FROSCH 
Trustee under this my Last Will and Testament. In the event he should die 
or fail to qualify, or resign or for any other reason be unable to act, I nomi-
nate, constitute and appoint L. Arnold Weissberger in his place and stead. 
Marilyn Monroe (L.S.) 
SIGNED, SEALED, PUBLISHED and DECLARED by MARILYN 
MONROE, the Testatrix above named, as and for her Last Will and Testa-
ment, in our presence and we, at her request and in her presence and in the 
presence of each other, have hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses 
this 14th day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty-One 
Aaron R. Frosch residing at 10 West 86th St. NYC  
Louise H. White residing at 709 E. 56 St., New York, NY 
 
